Gene Mills is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. He came to VCU in 1991, after receiving his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley. He has published on a variety of topics, including personal identity, mental causation, justification, and the liar paradox.
Publications
Articles
“Are Analytic Philosophers Shallow and Stupid?” Journal of Philosophy 105 (2008), 301-19.
“Scheming and Lying: Truth-Schemas, Propositions, and the Liar,” in Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox, ed. Emmanuel Genot, Dov Gabbay, and Tero Tulenheimo, Kluwer (2008), 113-28.
“The Egg
and I: Conception, Identity, and Abortion,” The
Philosophical Review 117 (2008), 323-48.
“The
Sweet Mystery of Compatibilism,”
“Williamson on
Vagueness and Context-Dependence,” Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004), 635-41.
“Scheffler on Rawls, Justice, and Desert,” Law and Philosophy 23 (2004), 261-72.
“Competence and
Contradictory Commitments,” Philosophical
Books 45 (2004), 1-11.
“An
Epistemic Reductio of Causal Reductionism,” Topoi 22 (2003), 151-61.
“Audi on Rationality and Justification,” Philosophical Books 44 (2003), 12-20.
"Fallibility
and the Phenomenal Sorites," Noűs 36 (2002),
384-407.
“Introducing Personal Identity,” Teaching Philosophy 24 (2001), 19-27.
“A Simple Solution to the Liar,” Philosophical Studies 89 (1998), 197-212.
“The Unity of Justification,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998), 27-50.
“A Fripkean Theory of
Names,” Acta analytica
19 (1997), 57-70.
“Devitt on the Nature of
Belief,” in The Maribor Papers in
Naturalized Semantics, ed. Dunja Jutronic (1997: Pedagoska fakulteta
“Interactionism and Physicality,” Ratio 10 (1997), 169-83.
“Term Limits and the Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Public Affairs Quarterly 10 (1996),
143-52.
“Interactionism and Overdetermination,” American
“Giving Up on the Hard Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1996),
26-32.
“Dividing without Reducing: Bodily Fission and
Personal Identity,” Mind 102 (1993),
37-51.
“Forbes’s Branching Conception of Possible Worlds,” Analysis 51 (1991), 48-50.
Reviews
Review of David Owens, Reason without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.
Mind 111 (2002),
462-5.
Review of Jonathan Kvanvig, The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the
Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology. Mind 102 (1993), 661-665.
Editorial project
Guest editor of Topoi 22 (2003), on “Causal
Criteria of Reality”. Includes introductory essay.
Anthologization
“Giving Up on the Hard Problem of
Consciousness” (above), in Explaining
Consciousness: The Hard Problem, ed.
Jonathan Shear (1997: MIT Press).